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Bank Loan Supply and Corporate Capital Structure: Recent Evidence 
from China 
 
Abstract: 
This paper provides new evidence of supply side effects on corporate capital structure in 
China. We find that bank-dependent firms, that are large and state-owned companies in China, 
increase (decrease) their leverage ratios if loan supplies increase (decrease) relative to small 
and private firms due to their ability to access bank loans. With ability to substitute different 
forms of capital sources, large and state-owned firms are relatively less (more) likely to use 
internal funds and equity financing when bank loans are (not) available than small and private 
firms. During credit boom in 2009 and 2010, the large and state-owned firms increase 
leverage ratios by 2.26% and 2.76% more than matching firms; and small and private firms 
are shown to decrease leverage in this period. These findings lend support to the importance 
of supply side effects and bank loan segmentation on capital structure decisions.  
 
JEL Classifications:  G21; G32;  
Keywords:  
Bank loan supply; access to bank loans; corporate leverage; financing choice; loan financing  
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Bank Loan Supply and Corporate Capital Structure: Recent Evidence 
from China 
1. Introduction 
The finance literature indicates that market frictions and the types of available capital 
influence a firm’s capital structure. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) indicate that firms with 
access to public bond market have significantly higher leverage than the firms without such 
access. Sufi (2007) finds that the introduction of bank loan rating allows the firms with lower 
credit quality to access to public debt market and increase the use of debt. Higher leverages 
are also found in the firms with traded CDS contracts that reduce the market friction in debt 
market (Saretto and Tookes, 2013). The supply of external capital also helps to determine 
corporate leverage. Some studies show that exogenous shocks on the supply of capital have 
varying impacts on capital structure, which depend on firms’ abilities to raise capital, e.g., 
investment-grade vs. noninvestment-grade firms, large vs. small firms, and firms with more 
matured debts vs. firms with less matured debts (Leary, 2009; Almeida et. al., 2009; Erel et. 
al., 2012). The ability to use different forms of external financing and substitution among 
them are found to affect bank borrowings and corporate investment in credit contractions 
(Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox, 1993; Becker and Ivashina, 2014). These studies are related to a 
new strand of corporate finance literature, that demonstrates that the supply of capital, debt or 
loans, as well as the factors from the demand side, determines corporate capital structure, due 
to market segmentation or frictions in substituting multiple sources of capital (see the review 
in Graham and Leary (2011)). 
Kahle and Stulz (2013) explore the impacts of supply (lending or credit) shock and 
demand shock on corporate policies in 2007 credit crisis. The supply shock channels indicate 
that the firms that rely on bank loan or credit would have to reduce debt issuance and capital 
expenditure during the 2007 credit crisis because the crisis results in a credit contraction. 
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Inconsistent with prior literature, they show that bank-dependent firms do not have more 
decreases in net debt issuance or capital expenditure, which question the role of bank lending 
supply in corporate policies. The possible reasons could be that the bank loans have become 
less important funding source and firms may have multiple methods to obtain financing other 
than loans in US.  
Whether the lending/credit supplies determine capital structure is still debatable. In this 
study, we examine this question in the emerging capital market of China for several reasons. 
First, the banking system in China is often the sole and most important external financing 
source for companies, as non-bank financings are relatively rare due to the immature capital 
market. Equity issues (as well as bond issues) are subject to strict quotas set by the regulator, 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC), and in some years the quota is zero 
thus closing down the IPO market and even the market for secondary offerings. Second, the 
banking system is controlled by the government and is used as a policy tool for addressing 
national and social priorities. Furthermore, access to credit may be determined by political 
considerations and connections rather than determined on a commercial basis. Many studies 
show that big and state-owned firms have priority to access to bank loan (a recent observation 
is from Martin (2012)); while small and private firms are restricted to access to bank loan. 
The market segmentations in China provide opportunities to observe how the shock in bank 
loan supply, as supply side factor, affects corporate capital structure of different firms 
depending on their access to bank financing. Third, monetary policy and bank loan supply are 
frequently adopted to stimulate economic growth in emerging countries. A recent 
phenomenon is the significant credit growth since 2008 in large emerging markets like India, 
China, Turkey and Brazil (Onaran, 2013). In China, the supply of bank loans substantially 
increased in 2009 and 2010 following an expansionary monetary policy. The consequences of 
bank loan supply shock on corporate financial policies in different groups of firms are 
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unknown. For these reasons, we believe that the evidences from emerging markets can make 
contribution to current corporate finance literature in bank lending shock.  
In this paper, we explore the role of bank lending shock as supply side effect in capital 
structure among different groups of firms in China. Our study has several objectives. First, 
we investigate the impacts of loan supply shocks on the leverage ratios of listed Chinese 
firms that have ability to access to bank loan or have been restricted to loans. Second, since 
the bank loan is the most important external financing and some firms are able to use such 
capital, we study the substitutions from internal funds/equity financing to bank financing due 
to changes in the bank loan supply in China’s listed companies. Third, similar to the studies 
on 2007 credit crisis (for example, Kahle and Stulz, 2013), we use a special event/period, the 
credit boom from the last quarter of 2008 to 2010, to examine the importance of access to 
bank loan and the lending supply shock.  
From prior literature, the intuitions behind the view of supply side effect are follows. 
First, there are some firms that are restricted to public debt market due to information 
asymmetry or others, and have to rely more on bank lending/credit (impaired access to capital 
and bank-dependent). Second, these companies, normally small or unrated firms (Leary, 2009; 
Kahle and Stulz, 2013), are unable to substitute bank lending from other external financing 
sources. Thus if bank loan supply increases (decreases), they will obtain more (less) loans 
and increase (decrease) leverages. In the contrary, large firms and firms with higher credit 
quality or credit ratings are not sensitive to bank loan supply because they can use other 
external funds if bank loan supply is not available. Unlike the studies in US context, our 
groups of bank-dependent firms are not the firms with impaired access to capital market or 
small firms. In this paper, the “bank-dependent” firms are large firms and state-owned firms, 
as state-owned banks have preferential treatment on these firms. These firms have advantage 
to access to bank loan. Small and private (not owned by state) firms are the groups of firms 
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that have impaired access to bank loan (capital in China’s market). Similar to the logics in 
previous studies in US, we expect that bank lending shock would generate more impacts on 
bank-dependent firms (large and state-owned firms in this study) than the firms with impaired 
access to loan (small and private firms).   
The findings in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, large and state-owned 
firms have a larger (smaller) increase in corporate leverage when bank loans are expanded 
(contracted) than small and private firms. The reason is that these firms can access to bank 
loan and rely more on bank loan. Small and private firms are restricted to loan market and 
thus not sensitive to bank supply shock. Our findings are opposite to the findings of Leary 
(2009) that large U.S. firms are less bank-dependent because of the availability of public debt 
whereas in our study, large firms in China are more bank-dependent and bank loans are the 
most important external source of financing. The difference in findings may be due to 
different market segmentations as a large U.S. (small) firm is able (unable) to substitute bank 
loans with public debt and in China large (small) firm is able (unable) to substitute internal 
funds/equity financing with bank loans. Second, we test the financing choice and the 
substitute between internal funds, bank loans and equity financing. We find that large and 
state-owned firms tend to use less (more) internal funds and equity financing when bank loan 
supply increases (decreases) than small and private firms. This is due to the preferential 
treatment given to large and state-owned firms in China’s banking system, which allows these 
firms to rely less on internal funds and equity financing. Small and state-owned firms, 
however, cannot substitute other financings by bank loans. Third, using the event of credit 
boom between 2008Q4 and 2010Q4 in China, we find that large and state-owned firms 
increase leverage ratios by 2.26% and 2.76% more than matching firms during the credit 
boom periods. The leverage ratios decrease more in small and private firms than matching 
firms. State-owned firms are found to receive more bank loans by 1.94% (quarterly basis) 
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than matching firms.    
This paper makes several contributions to the current literature. First, it supports the 
predictions of supply side impacts on capital structure in a developing country. Unlike US 
corporations that have the flexibility to switch among different forms of external financing, 
China’s listed companies with access to bank loans significantly increase corporate leverage 
when loan supply increases. Second, our paper is the first paper to explore the impacts of 
bank loan supply and access to bank loans on financing choices between internal funds and 
external financing in China. We find that an increase in bank loan supply reduces the 
probability of using internal funds in large and state-owned companies, which supports the 
supply side effects of bank financing. Finally, our empirical findings support the claims in the 
report on China’s banking system from the Congressional Research Service that China’s 
banks give preferential treatment in lending to selected companies, usually large, state-owned 
and historically served firms (Martin, 2012). The stimulus program from late 2008 lends 
more support to these companies than to small and medium firms, despite the government’s 
avowed intent to help small and medium sized firms.      
This paper is structured as follows.  The next section presents the literature review and, 
and gives a background on credit expansion in China. The third section introduces the 
hypotheses development, data, variables and methodologies. Empirical results and associated 
discussions are presented in section 4. The final section concludes the paper. 
2. Background, Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Institutional Background 
The banking system in China has experienced significant reforms since 1978. A recent 
reform from 2003
1
 is to transform previous state-owned banks into listed, joint-stock and 
                                                 
1 
In 2003, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was established to oversee China’s banks and 
promote the reforms in the banking system. 
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competitive commercial entities. Five major commercial banks in China have been listed in 
Hong Kong and mainland China exchanges starting from 2005
2
. There are several important 
characteristics of China’s banks: first, state ownership is still large in these five major banks; 
second, the CEOs and directors in these banks are still assigned by the central government; 
and third, the central bank in China can regulate the operations, loans supply and services of 
these banks through multiple channels and determine the quotas and interest rate of lending. 
There is an ongoing debate on whether the banks should continue to be used to implement 
policies set by central government or whether they should operate based on commercial 
principles (Martin, 2012).    
The central bank in China, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), can employ many 
instruments to impact banks’ practices. The PBC sets the direction of monetary policy and 
adopts instruments to increase or decrease bank loans. We use the stimulus program starting 
from 2008 Quarter Four to show how monetary policy influences bank loans in China. The 
central government shifted the monetary policy from a moderately tight level to a moderately 
loose level, following by several instruments to boost bank loan supply
3
 between the end of 
2008 and 2010. The loose monetary policy effectively increases money and credit supply. 
The growth of bank loans and money supply can be easily observed from macroeconomic 
data. Figure 1, shows that the money supply (M2) and bank credit increases suddenly in 
2008Q4. The trend of high loan and M2 growth lasts to the fourth quarter of 2010 when the 
government turned monetary policy from “a moderately loose monetary policy” to “a prudent 
monetary policy” (PBC, 2008). After that, the loan growth rate falls below the average level. 
The same pattern can also be found in the ratios of M2/GDP and Loan/GDP. Basically, we 
                                                 
2
 These banks are The Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, and the Bank of Communications. They listed on the exchanges in 2010, 2006, 
2005, 2006, and 2005, respectively. 
3
 The details of instruments can be found in China Monetary Report Quarter Four, 2008. 
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can conclude that the money supply and bank loans substantially increase during the stimulus 
period 2008Q4-2010Q4 due to the expansionary policy by PBC.  
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
    In addition to deciding bank loan supply, the central bank also gives some guidance on 
lending practices. In the 2008 Q4, the PBC states its monetary policy as “to guide financial 
institutions to increase credit lending to agriculture, rural areas, and farmers, small- and 
medium-sized enterprises, and post-disaster reconstruction on a preferential basis” (PBC, 
2008). The China Banking Regulatory Commission put pressure on banks to require them to 
allocate loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises. However, according to the interviews 
by Congressional Research Service of US, “the banks perceive their past creditors more 
favorably than new creditors, and the banks have a tendency to provide loans to the larger, 
well-established state-owned and private corporations” (Page 21, Martin, 2012, p.21). 
The credit boom may affect the capital structure of firms in China; however, the impacts 
are not clear. Some reports show that only 10 percent of the massive increased bank lending 
flowed to smaller firms (Leow, 2009; The Economist, 2009). Yet Lardy (2012) argued that at 
the aggregate bank lending level, household businesses, small size, and medium size firms 
can obtain more loans than large firms in 2009 and 2010; and the growths of loans to small 
and medium firms are much higher than the growth in lending to large firms (See Figure 1 in 
Lardy, 2012). The debate is related to the firm’s ability to access to bank loan in credit boom: 
if the large and state-owned firms are still bank-dependent and maintain priority to loans, 
then the credit boom would lead to more loan financing and higher leverage in the these firm; 
one the other hand, the small and private firms may have relatively more borrowings from 
banks during credit boom if the access restriction is removed. We solve the debate by 
conducting matching approach of Abadie and Imbens (2006) and investigating corporate 
financial policies in credit boom for groups of large firms, small firms, state-owned firms and 
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private firms, following the literature in credit supply side and capital structure. Our study of 
China’s companies provides new evidence on the supply side impacts and on which firms are 
benefited in credit boom. 
2.2 Literature Review 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006, Page 46) examine the intuition that “the variables that 
measure the constraints on a firm’s ability to increase its leverage (the supply side)” are also 
related to corporate capital structure. They use the presence of a credit rating to measure the 
access to the public debt market. Having a credit rating may help a firm to obtain more 
capital or cheaper capital from the public market, while a firm with limited access to public 
capital markets (firms that are riskier, smaller and less well known) has to rely on capital 
from financial intermediaries and to incur additional costs in borrowing due to the needs of 
increased monitoring. Their results indicate that the firms with a credit rating have a 35% 
larger leverage than the firms without a credit rating after controlling for the corporate 
variables that may determine capital structure. Those firms without a credit rating have to 
borrow from financial intermediaries, which the information asymmetry and the cost of 
monitoring would increase the cost of debt capital and ration the credit quantity.  
Sufi (2009) investigates the effects of the introduction of bank loan ratings, which 
reduces the monitoring and certification costs of raising debt financing. The empirical results 
show that the introduction of bank loan ratings increases the use of debt financing and leads 
to more asset growth and investment, especially for the firms without a high credit quality 
and rating before. Similarly, Saretto and Tooke (2013) find a positive relationship between 
the existence of CDS trading on the firm and its leverage. The trading of CDS reduces the 
market friction of debt financing because a capital supplier may use CDS to reduce its 
regulatory capital requirement and mitigate portfolio risk and credit risk, which increases 
debt supply. Thus, the increase of debt supply allows firms to have larger leverage.  
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Other studies have explored the impacts of external shocks on capital supply in addition 
to a firm’s ability to access external capital. Leary (2009) argues that large firms, which are 
relatively transparent and less informationally opaque, are able to access private debt and 
equity, leading to a lower impact from loan supply shocks. He uses two events, the 1961 
emergence of the market for certificates of deposit and the 1966 Credit Crunch, to investigate 
the impacts of bank loan shocks on capital structure. The firm’s characteristics (small or large; 
bank-dependent or non bank-dependent) that are related to informational asymmetry and 
transaction costs in financing, along with the supply of bank loans, determine the amounts of 
debt that a firm may use in a specific period. The increases (decreases) of leverage in small 
and bank-dependent firms are more significant for positive (negative) loan supply shocks 
than for large firms with access to public capital markets. The empirical results confirm the 
role of credit supply in capital structure. The macroeconomic conditions are found to affect a 
firm’s capital raising decisions in Erel, Julio, Kim and Weisbach (2011). They find that 
lower-rated, non investment-grade firms have a lower probability to raise capital when the 
overall market turns worse, but the poor macroeconomic conditions do not affect the 
financing ability of higher-rated firms.  
The availability of external financing can also influence corporate real outcomes like 
investment. Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2011) find that the firms with 
large portions of long term debt after the 2007 financial crisis have to reduce their investment. 
Lemmon and Roberts (2010) examine three events that cause a reduction in capital 
availability to non-investment grade firms, and test the impacts of capital availability on 
corporate financing patterns. The net security issuance and corporate investment are found to 
decrease in below investment grade firms after these events. Overall, they confirm that the 
exogenous shocks in the supply of capital have significant impacts on corporate behavior 
including financial and investment decisions. In contrary, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find that 
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bank-dependent firms do not have more decrease in corporate investment and net debt 
issuance than matching firms during the 2007 financial crisis. They question the view that 
bank lending supply determines corporate investment and financial policies. We will adopt 
similar approach to exam this view in the context of credit boom in China. 
 
3. Data, Methods, Models and Variables 
3.1 Hypotheses Development 
    In contrast to the studies of Faulkender and Peterson (2005), Leary (2009) and Kahle 
and Stulz (2013), large (and state-owned) firms in China are bank dependent due to the lack 
of public capital and preferential lower interest rates charged by state-owned banks at least 
before the recent banking reforms (Song, 2005; Ferri and Liu, 2010). Small and private firms 
are still limited in their access to bank lending because of information asymmetry (Firth, Lin, 
Liu and Wong, 2009). The state-owned banks choose what they perceive to be more reliable 
and better supported companies as clients, i.e., those that are large and state-owned. These 
companies are hence more sensitive to the exogenous shocks of bank loan supply.  The 
prediction can be expressed in following hypothesis. 
H1. Given other conditions equal, large and state-owned firms have relatively 
larger increases in debt (decreases) when the bank loan supplies are increased 
(decreased).  
    We also examine financing patterns and capital substitutions between internal financing 
and external financing that are affected by bank loan supply as previous studies show that the 
firms with impaired access to capital may not be able to substitute the bank loan with other 
source of financing and would be impacted more by bank loan shock. As mentioned before, a 
bank loan is the most important external financing source in many Chinese companies. With 
limited access to bank loans, internal funds/equity financing should be more important for 
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small and private firms (Guariglia, Liu and Song, 2011; Ding, Guariglia and Knight, 2013). 
Large and state-owned firms will turn to bank loan financing and use less internal funds or 
external equity financing if the bank loans are cheaper and easier to obtain in credit 
expansion periods. The increase (decrease) of bank loan supply will cause these firms less 
(more) likely to use internal funds or equity funds than small and private firms, while small 
and private firms have to rely on internal funds or equity funds both in credit expansion and 
contraction periods because they are rationed in the bank loan market. We expect that small 
and private firms will have to choose internal or equity funds as their preferred financing 
choice, while large and state-owned firm will take bank loans as their preferred choice. These 
financing patterns should be exaggerated when the supply of bank loans increases. We 
develop the following hypothesis. 
H2. Given other conditions equal, large and state-owned firms are less (more) likely 
to use internal funds or equity funds than small and private firms when bank loan 
supplies increase (decrease). 
    Similar to previous studies in the events of credit boom and contraction, and 2007 credit 
crisis, we use the event of credit expansion of 2008-2010 in China to explore different 
financing patterns. Unlike the findings of Leary (2009), we expect that large firm and 
state-owned firm would obtain more loans during credit boom than small and private firms.  
H3. Given other condition equal, large and state-owned firms have larger increase 
in corporate leverage and loan financing during credit boom (2008Q4-2010Q4) than 
small and private firms.  
3.2 Key Variables, Methods and Models  
We use two approaches to test our hypotheses. The first approach is to use multivariate 
regression similar to previous studies (Faulkender and Peterson, 2006; Leary, 2009; Duchih, 
Ozbas and Sensoy, 2010), in which the key variables are dummy variable of access to bank 
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loans and the interaction terms of access to bank loans and bank loan supply. The other is the 
matching approach of Abadie and Imbens (2006), which is used to estimate the impacts of 
credit crisis on corporate policies in treated and control groups (Almeida, Campello, 
Laranjeira and Weisbenner, 2012; Kahle and Stulz, 2013). The first approach is used to test 
hypothesis one and two; and the second is to investigate the hypothesis three.  
In first approach, we use two dummy variables to measure whether a firm has access to 
bank loans based on firm size and state ownership. Many studies show that firm size is a key 
factor to determine whether a company can access capital markets and bank financing. 
Previous studies also indicate state-owned companies have priority in obtaining bank loans in 
China. Following the approach of Leary (2009) and Kahle and Stulz (2013), access (limited 
access) to bank loans by firm size is defined by the upper (lower) two deciles of quarterly 
average total book assets. Access (limited access) to bank loans by state ownership is defined 
by the upper four deciles (lower four deciles, state ownership equals to 0) of quarterly 
average state ownership. Appendix 1 shows the details on how the variables of access to bank 
loan are created in our data sample. 
[Insert Appendix 1 Here] 
We use three variables to measure the exogenous supply of bank loans, LOANGDP and 
LNLOAN, which are bank loans over GDP ratio and the log value of quarterly bank loans 
taken directly from the macroeconomic data provided by the People’s Bank of China. These 
two variables are constructed to measure credit cycle in the studies of Schularick and Taylor 
(2012) and Aikman, Haldane and Nelson (2014). We also create a variable to measure the 
shocks of bank loan supply similar to Kashyap and Stein (2000), Campello (2003), and 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004). The variable RESLOAN is calculated from the 
residual of an autoregressive–moving-average model of log quarterly bank loans on three lags 
of the same quarter’s bank loans. 
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The variables of interest in the first approach are the interaction terms of access 
variables and macroeconomic bank loan variables. Similar to the papers of Faulkender and 
Peterson (2006) and Leary (2009), our paper includes the variables of access to bank loans 
and the above interaction variables to test hypotheses H1 and H2. Variables from the demand 
side are also incorporated in the tests. The base regression function for leverage is, 
                                                               (1)                                                        
The interaction term is expected to have positive coefficients according to H1. The term 
is dummy variable ACCESS multiplied by the bank loan supply. Control variables X are 
corporate variables from the demand side including market to book value (MTBV; a negative 
sign is expected), firm size (LNTA; positive), tangibility (TANG; positive), and profitability 
(PROFIT; negative)(see the discussions in Frank and Goyal, 2009). We also include state 
ownership (STATESHARE) as a control variable as many studies have shown that state 
ownership is an important factor in the capital structure decisions of Chinese companies 
(Qian, Tian and Wirjanto, 2009; Li, Yue and Zhao, 2009). The variable ν is the fixed effect for 
industry
4
. The variable Q is the industry-quarter fixed effect.  
The second hypothesis involves financing patterns in different groups of companies in 
China. We expect that the companies with limited access to bank loans will rely on internal 
funds (or equity financing) more heavily. We also predict that an exogenous shock in bank 
loans will have different impacts on the companies with full and with limited access to bank 
loans. A multinomial logit model similar to Denis and Mihov (2003), Korajczyk and Levy 
(2003), and Leary (2009) is employed to explore this financing pattern. The dependent 
variable FINCHOICE has a value of zero for internal funds, one for net borrowing and two 
for net equity financing
5
. The internal funds are the sum of net income and depreciation in the 
                                                 
4
 We also run the regressions in fixed effect by firms. The results still hold. 
5
 The cash flow statements of Chinese listed companies report cash received from and paid for borrowings, 
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company. Net borrowing is the proceeds from borrowing net of cash repayment of amounts 
borrowed. Net equity financing is cash received from investment including the proceeds from 
equity minus cash paid for dividends. The multinomial logit models for H2 have similar 
forms to Equations (1) and (2).  
                                                                
                                                                          (2) 
We use the event of credit boom and employ a matching approach to test H3, similar to 
Almeida, Campello, Laranjera and Weisbenner (2012) and Kahle and Stulz (2013). 
According to the central bank’s monetary policy reports, the loose monetary policy lasts from 
Quarter Four 2008 to Quarter Four 2010, totally nine quarters. We determine the groups of 
treatment firms by firm size and state ownership on the third quarter of 2008 before the credit 
boom periods. The groups of large firms and small firms are the firms in top and bottom 
quintile of total assets in our data sample on 2008Q3. Similarly, we choose the firms in the 
top quintile of state ownership and the firms with zero state ownership at the end of the third 
quarter of 2008 as state-owned group and private group. Using the approach in Abadie, 
Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004), we match the firms in these four treatment groups with 
control firms in our data sample on 2008Q3. The variables in the matching are 
market-to-book ratio, cash flow, cash holdings, size, leverage ratio, state ownership, and 
industrial classification code, following the studies of Almeida, Campello, Laranjera and 
Weisbenner (2012) and Kahle and Stulz (2013). The changes of leverage ratio and loan 
borrowing in treatment groups due to credit boom are estimated and compared with the 
changes in control groups. The hypothesis three is confirmed if the treatment groups of large 
                                                                                                                                                        
investment (including equity and bond issuance) and other proceeds from financing activities. Thus, we can 
precisely know the amount of capital from each source. The dependent variable is measured by the financing 
choice in a firm that has been used most in the quarter.   
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firms and state-owned firms show more increases in leverage and loan financing than control 
firms due to credit boom.  
3.3 Sample and Data Source  
    The firm-level data are obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR). The macroeconomic data are from National Bureau of Statistics of 
China and the People’s Bank of China. The full data sample contains all listed companies on 
the Chinese exchanges by quarter basis. The time periods are from 2002Q1 to 2013Q2
6
. The 
firms in finance industry are excluded in the sample (2601 firms in the rest). We also drop 
observations with negative values in total assets, sales, and cash holdings. The observations 
are also deleted if total liabilities are larger than total assets or market value of total assets. 
Following Almeida, Campello, Laranjera and Weisbenner (2012), we also disregard the 
observations with asset growth and sale growth larger than 100% in a quarter. Firm variables 
are further winsorized at the 95% level (top and bottom 2.5%) to reduce the outlier effects. 
The definitions and data sources of variables are given in Appendix 2. 
[Insert Appendix 2 Here] 
4. Results and Discussions 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
    Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of variables for regression functions in the full 
sample data. It also shows the financing patterns of Chinese listed companies. There are three 
major capital sources in China: internal funds, bank borrowing, and external investment 
(including equity and bond issuances). The most significant fund source is the borrowings 
(BORW) from banks or other financial institutions, which is 14.2% of total assets in each 
quarter. Yet the net borrowings (NETBORW), which are the borrowings net of cash 
repayment for amount borrowed, are only 1.4% of total assets. The reason is that the firms 
                                                 
6
 The starting quarter is 2002Q1 because CSMAR started to report quarterly financial statements from 2002.  
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have to repay a substantial amount of principal each quarter. Internal fund (CF) is 3.7% of 
total assets in each quarter. Another important source is external investment, mainly the 
equity issuance (from data, we can find bond issuance is negligible). The fund from equity 
issuance (EQUITY) is 3.2% of total asset, slightly lower than internal fund. Net equity 
issuance (NETEQUITY) represents the funds from equity issuance net of dividend payment 
(approximately 3.2%). The holding of cash and cash equivalents (CASH) is high (18.1% of 
total assets) in China. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 4.2 Bank Loan Supply and Capital Structure 
    Table 2 reports the results of regression Equation (1). We use all listed companies 
(excluding firms in finance industry) in China’s stock markets from 2002Q1 to 2013Q2. The 
key variable is the interaction terms of bank loan supply and access to bank loans.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
The control variables have the expected coefficient signs in accordance with capital 
structure theory. The variables of market to book value, profitability ratio, and internal funds 
have negative and very significant coefficients (in almost all regressions in the tables), 
indicating that firms with high growth opportunities, large profits and sufficient internal funds 
would choose lower leverages. Firm size is positively related to corporate leverages, which 
are also similar to previous findings of capital structure decisions in the US market. 
Intuitively, large state ownership may indicate that the firm has political connections to 
state-owned banks, which may result in high leverage. However, the existing empirical 
results are mixed. Huang and Song (2006) argue that the state ownership does not 
significantly influence capital structure in China’s listed companies. In contrast, Qian, Tian, 
and Wirjanto (2009) find that the state shareholding is positively associated with the leverage 
ratio in listed companies. Li, Yue, and Zhao (2009) also find that state ownership is positively 
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related to leverage and the access to long term debt when using the data of unlisted 
companies. Our results show a non-significant and negative relationship between state 
ownership and leverage.  
The key variables in this paper are the interaction terms between the access to bank loan 
and macroeconomic variables of bank loan supply. H1 predicts that corporate leverages 
increase more for firms that are able to use bank loans when the supply of the bank loans 
increase. We use two variables to measure the accessibility (size and state ownership) and 
report the results in Panel A and B respectively. In Panel A, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms are all positive and very significant (at the 1% level). This indicates that when the 
central government decided to release more bank loans, the larger companies have priority in 
obtaining such bank loans and hence increase leverage more. The results for the measures of 
accessibility by state ownership are similar, except that in model 3 of Panel B, the coefficient 
of interaction term is positive but non-significant. We confirm that large and state-owned 
firms have priority in accessing bank loans, especially when the supply of bank loans 
increases. These results are not surprising as many studies in China economy have revealed 
similar findings, but our results make contributions to existing literature in supply side effects 
on capital structure. We support the view that bank lending shock is first-order determinant 
factor in capital structure, given the unique capital market in China. 
4.3 Bank Loan Supply and Financing Choice 
The most important external financing in China is the borrowings from banks and other 
financial institutions. The other external funds include the equity issuance, bond issuance and 
financing from other activities. The funds from bond issuance and other activities are very 
few, approximately 0% and 0.5% of total assets. So we focus on the three sources of funds: 
internal funds, borrowings and equity issuance. Similar to the studies of Leary (2009) and 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003), we study the impact of bank lending supply on financing choices 
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using the multinomial logistic regressions. We sort firm financings into three categories: 
internal funds, net funds from borrowings (borrowings net of principal repayments), and net 
funds from equity (proceedings from equity issuance net of payment of dividends). The 
dependent variable FINCHOICE is equal to 0 if internal funds dominate the other two forms, 
1 if borrowings dominate, and 2 if funds from equity issuance dominate. The choice of 
borrowings (group 1) is taken as omitted group in the regressions. The negative coefficients 
on the interaction terms of access to bank loans and the supply of bank loans confirm 
hypothesis H2. Table 3 reports the regression results for financing choices. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
    The primary variable in Table 3 is the interaction variables between the access dummy 
(by size and state ownership) and the variables of bank loan supply. Similar to Table 2, we 
report the results in Panel A and B for regressions by size and state ownership respectively. In 
Panel A, the coefficients on the interaction variables in the regressions of internal funds and 
net equity are negative and significant at the 1% level; and the results in Panel B by state 
ownership are similar to Panel B except some insignificant coefficients. The results support 
the predictions of H2 that large and state-owned firms with access to bank loans are less 
likely to use internal funds and equity financing when the supply of bank loans increase. 
They are able to switch financing sources between internal funds, equity financing and bank 
loans. In contrast, small and private firms would have to use internal funds or equity 
financing because of the restrictions on who obtains bank loans. Overall, these results 
confirm that firms with access to bank loans are more likely to use bank loans and less likely 
to use internal funds or equity financing with the increase of bank loan supply. They also 
support the view that bank lending shocks influence corporate financing choices as bank 
lending can be used to substitute internal funds and funds from equity financing in some 
firms with access to bank lending. 
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    There are some differences between our findings and previous studies in US. Leary 
(2009) finds that small firms (without access to public debt market; more bank-dependent) 
would use less internal funds and equity financing during credit expansion periods because 
they can use more bank loans. The logic is that bank-dependent firms would employ more 
bank loans and fewer sources other than bank loan when the bank loan supply increases. In 
this sense, our findings are similar to his. The large and state-owned firms in China are more 
bank-dependent and thus use bank lending to substitute other sources in credit booms. 
 4.4 Credit Boom and Corporate Financing Decisions 
In this section, we test the third hypothesis by the event of credit boom from 2008Q4 to 
2010Q4 in China. The bank-dependent firms will have more increases in leverage ratios and 
loan financings during loan boom periods according to the supply side view. We use two 
methods to explore the third hypothesis, by regressions with interaction terms of dummy 
variables for bank-dependent firms and credit boom periods (Leary, 2009; Duchin, Ozbas and 
Sensoy, 2010), and by matching approach (Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner, 
2011; and Kahle and Stulz, 2013).  
The dependent variables in regressions are quarterly leverage ratio (LEVERAGE) and 
loan borrowing ratio (BORW), which are the ratios of total liabilities and funds borrowed 
from banks and other financial institutions over total assets. The variable BOOM is a dummy 
indicator equal to 1 if the quarter is within credit boom periods from 2008Q4 to 2010Q4, and 
equal to 0 if within pre-boom period 2006Q3-2008Q3. 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
The regression results are presented in Table 4. As expected, large firms and state-owned 
firms have 2.7% and 4.1% more increases in leverage due to credit boom than small and 
private firms. The coefficients for interaction terms in leverage regressions are significant at 
least at 5% level. Model 3 and 4 in this table show that the increases of funds from 
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borrowings in credit boom in large and state-owned firms are 0.8% and 1.9% of total assets 
more than the increases in small and state-owned firms, although the coefficient in Model 3 is 
not significant.  
The alternative method is matching approach of Abadie and Imbens (2006). By 
employing this approach, we need to construct treatment groups and find the matching firms 
in non-treatment groups. The methods of determining treatment groups and identifying 
control groups are introduced above, similar to Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and 
Weisbenner (2011), and Kahle and Stulz (2013). We calculate the changes of leverage ratio 
and borrowings in the treatment groups before and during credit boom (2006Q3-2008Q3 vs. 
2008Q4-2010Q4), one year before boom and the first year of credit boom (2007Q4-2008Q3 
vs. 2008Q4-2009Q3), and first quarter of 2007 and first quarter of 2008 (2007Q1 vs. 
2008Q1); and then we compare the differences with the differences in control groups. The 
Abadie-Imbens’ average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) is reported by this 
difference-in-difference estimations as well as he estimators by traditional 
difference-in-difference (DID). 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Table 5 reports the estimators for quarterly leverage ratios before and during credit 
boom. Column 1 shows that the average quarterly leverage ratios in whole sample 
significantly increase during the credit boom, the first year of credit and the first quarter of 
2009. When comes to treatment group, we find that large firms and state-owned firms 
increase leverage by 2.88% and 2.36% in whole credit boom period in comparison with the 
leverages in pre-boom periods. The leverage ratios in these two groups are also increased 
significantly in the first year of credit boom and the first quarter of 2009. However, the 
leverage ratios in small and private firms are significantly decreased in the whole credit boom 
period. The decreases of the last two treatment groups are not significant in the first year of 
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credit boom and 2009Q1, though. 
The key variables are DID and ATT in the credit boom, its first year and 2009Q1, which 
are reported in Panel B. We can find that the increases in leverage ratios in the control groups 
are significantly less than the increases in treatment groups of large and state-owned firms in 
the whole credit boom period. DID and ATT estimators are significant at least at 5% level. 
According to ATT estimators, during credit boom the large and state-owned firms have 2.26% 
and 2.76% more increases in leverage than their matching firms. However, the small and 
private firms decrease leverage ratios in comparison with matching firms during credit boom. 
Especially, private firms significantly lower down leverage by 1.63% and 1.24% by DID and 
ATT estimations. Similar patterns can be seen in the first year of credit boom and 2009Q1. 
We can conclude that credit boom plays significantly role in capital structure in the firms that 
are more bank-dependent or able to access to bank loans, but it has no significant impact or 
even negative impact on the firms without access to bank loans. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
We conduct the same tests for the borrowings ratio before and during credit boom 
periods. Panel A of Table 6 shows that during the credit boom periods, the borrowings ratios 
increase 0.79%, 1.55% and 1.67% of total assets for the firms in whole sample, large firms 
group and state-owned firms group. The borrowings ratios also increase slightly in small 
firms and private firms with 0.73% and 0.06% respectively during credit boom. Panel B 
shows DID and ATT estimators for the treatment groups. State-owned firms have significant 
increases in loan financing by both DID and ATT estimations in whole credit boom period, 
first year of credit period and 2009Q1. Within the whole credit boom period, bank lending 
given to state-owned firms over total assets is 1.94% higher than the ratio of matching firms. 
Large firms have more increase in borrowings than matching firms in whole credit boom. 
However, the matching results indicate that large firms actually decrease borrowings more 
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than matching firms in the first year of credit boom and 2009Q1. The DID and ATT 
estimators for small firms and private firms are negative or not significant, indicating that the 
impacts of credit boom are trivial or negative. 
Overall, we confirm that the positive shock in credit supply play significant and positive 
role in financial policies of large and state-owned firms. The reason is that these firms obtain 
the ability to access to bank loan in China’s banking system. The small and private firms, 
however, are not affected or negatively affected by the credit boom. Our results support the 
view that credit supply shock is a determinant factor in financial decisions in an emerging 
capital market.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we explore the question whether bank lending shock affect capital 
structure and financing choices in China’s listed companies. Macroeconomic changes in bank 
loans and credit expansion from 2008 are used to test our predictions. We find that bank loan 
shocks significantly affect corporate leverage if the firms can access to banking system. 
Firms with the ability to obtain bank loans have larger increases in leverage ratios than firms 
restricted to banking if the bank loan supply increases. These results are similar to previous 
studies in supporting the view of credit supply impacts on corporate financial and investment 
policies. A significant difference in our studies is that bank-dependent firms are large and 
state-owned firms that have accessibility to bank loans. 
Next, we find that the credit supply cycle and access to bank loans also influence 
financing choices of listed companies in China. Firms with access to bank loans are less 
likely to use internal funds/equity financing and are more sensitive to the changes in bank 
loans. In contrast, firms that have restricted access to the loan markets have to rely more on 
internal funds and are not able to switch to loan financing even in credit expansion periods. 
We also find that large and state-owned firms increase leverage and loan financing more than 
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matching firms in credit boom. The small and private firms have opposite results in these 
financing policies 
Overall, these results suggest that bank lending plays significant role in determining 
corporate capital structure in China. They lend support to supply side view. These findings 
also have important policy implications for the reforms of the banking system in China. The 
monetary policy in China may have little impact on helping small and private firms as long as 
the market segmentations exist.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Note: LEVERAGE is book leverage. BORW and NETBORW are funds from borrowings and net borrowings. 
FINCHOICE is financing choice in choosing internal funds, bank loans or equity financing. ACCESS is the 
variable of access to bank loans by firm size and state ownership. LOANGROWTH is quarterly loan growth 
rate. LOANGDP is the ratio of loans over GDP. LNLOAN is the log value of quarterly bank loans. RSDLOAN 
is the residual from autoregressive model of quarterly bank loans. The detailed definitions of other controlling 
variables can be found in Appendix 3. 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of full sample 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables and key variables       
LEVERAGE 59061 0.463 0.476 0.197 0.105 0.789 
BORW 53063 0.142 0.100 0.138 0 0.465 
NETBROW 53063 0.014 0.002 0.051 -0.083 0.130 
FINCHOICE 59077 0.554 0 0.727 0 2 
ACCESS(SIZE) 22767 0.603 1 0.489 0 1 
ACCESS(STATE) 42851 0.707 1 0.455 0 1 
LOANGDP 59077 4.341 4.385 0.663 3.053 5.533 
LNLOAN 59077 9.264 9.470 0.738 6.576 10.740 
RSDLOAN 59077 0.006 0.026 0.494 -1.602 1.394 
Control variables and others         
MTBV 56329 2.165 1.805 1.129 0.964 5.114 
PROFIT 58946 0.080 0.063 0.122 -0.180 0.358 
TANG 59061 0.259 0.229 0.168 0.022 0.607 
STATESHARE 57312 0.200 0.024 0.242 0 0.665 
LNTA 59070 21.444 21.324 1.039 19.796 23.640 
INDUSLEVE 59077 0.470 0.481 0.106 0.270 0.650 
AGE 59077 11.330 11 4.934 0 31.25 
GDPGROWTH 59077 0.101 0.1 0.019 0.066 0.145 
CF 56264 0.037 0.028 0.034 -0.011 0.118 
EQUITY 42927 0.032 0 0.092 0 0.363 
NETEQUITY 42927 0.032 0 0.092 -0.002 0.362 
BOND 33551 0 0 0 0 0 
OTHER 43708 0.005 0 0.012 0 0.047 
CASH 59059 0.181 0.141 0.136 0.023 0.515 
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Table 2: Bank loan supply, access to bank loans, and capital structure 
                                                            
The dependent variable is book leverage. Two variables are created to measure the ability to obtain bank loans 
by firm size and state ownership. Panel A and B report results for these two measures respectively. The key 
variable is the interaction term of bank loan supply and access to bank loan. The results with industry-fixed 
effect are given in each panel. Clustered standard errors at the firm level are presented in the brackets for 
coefficients. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Panel A: By firm size Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ACCESS 0.089*** -0.157** 0.144*** 
 
(0.026) (0.074) (0.014) 
ACCESS*LOANGDP 0.013*** 
  
 
(0.005) 
  ACCESS*LNLOAN 
 
0.033*** 
 
  
(0.008) 
 ACCESS*RSDLOAN 
  
0.014*** 
   
(0.005) 
L.MTBV -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.019*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
L.PROFIT -0.340*** -0.337*** -0.339*** 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
L.TANG 0.084** 0.085** 0.083** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
L.CF -1.234*** -1.228*** -1.238*** 
 
(0.157) (0.157) (0.156) 
L.STATESHARE -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
AGE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.423*** 0.421*** 0.424*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
N 14370 14370 14370 
N of Groups 1020 1020 1020 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4985 0.5008 0.4984 
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Table 2- cont’d 
Panel B: By state ownership Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
ACCESS -0.022 -0.374*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.018) (0.064) (0.010) 
ACCESS*LOANGDP 0.014*** 
  
 
(0.003) 
  ACCESS*LNLOAN 
 
0.044*** 
 
  
(0.006) 
 ACCESS*RSDLOAN 
  
0.003 
   
(0.003) 
L.MTBV -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
L.PROFIT -0.469*** -0.465*** -0.469*** 
 
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036) 
L.TANG 0.061** 0.059** 0.061** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
L.CF -0.980*** -0.975*** -0.982*** 
 
(0.117) (0.117) (0.118) 
L.LNTA 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
AGE 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.974*** -0.950*** -0.979*** 
 
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
N 14370 14370 14370 
N of Groups 1020 1020 1020 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.5218 0.5220 0.5217 
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Table 3: Bank loan supply, access to bank loan and financing choices 
                                                    
The dependent variable is financing choice, which equal to 1 if the internal funds dominate other funds, 2 if 
borrowings dominate, and 3 if equity financings dominate. In the result tables, borrowings are the omitted group. 
The key variable is the interaction term of bank loan supply and access to bank loan. Clustered standard errors at 
the firm level are presented in the brackets for coefficients. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance 
levels, respectively. 
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Panel A: By firm size 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Internal Fund Net Equity Internal Fund Net Equity Internal Fund Net Equity 
ACCESS 0.631*** 2.554*** 1.372*** 3.189*** -0.036 -0.288 
 
(0.228) (0.366) (0.438) (0.658) (0.174) (0.225) 
ACCESS*LOANGDP -0.157*** -0.669*** 
    
 
(0.039) (0.068) 
    ACCESS*LNLOAN 
  
-0.164*** -0.400*** 
  
   
(0.047) (0.070) 
  ACCESS*RSDLOAN 
    
-0.105*** -0.461*** 
     
(0.040) (0.077) 
L.LEVERAGE -2.633*** -1.552*** -2.617*** -1.528*** -2.627*** -1.535*** 
 
(0.231) (0.327) (0.230) (0.326) (0.230) (0.324) 
L.MTBV 0.116*** 0.276*** 0.125*** 0.294*** 0.114*** 0.269*** 
 
(0.032) (0.042) (0.032) (0.042) (0.033) (0.042) 
L.PROFIT 0.569* -3.336*** 0.564* -3.308*** 0.593* -3.225*** 
 
(0.316) (0.447) (0.316) (0.444) (0.315) (0.443) 
L.TANG 0.250 -0.344 0.240 -0.363 0.250 -0.353 
 
(0.207) (0.340) (0.206) (0.339) (0.207) (0.338) 
L.OPCF 8.027*** 2.588*** 7.985*** 2.382*** 7.974*** 2.429*** 
 
(0.470) (0.672) (0.470) (0.671) (0.470) (0.670) 
L.CASH 2.131*** 3.902*** 2.144*** 3.914*** 2.124*** 3.863*** 
 
(0.328) (0.454) (0.328) (0.451) (0.327) (0.449) 
L.STATESHARE 0.190 -0.225 0.153 -0.281 0.228 -0.111 
 
(0.141) (0.203) (0.142) (0.205) (0.141) (0.201) 
L.LNTA -0.096 -0.019 -0.049 0.090 -0.104* -0.038 
 
(0.060) (0.081) (0.062) (0.080) (0.060) (0.079) 
AGE 0.025*** 0.014 0.027*** 0.017* 0.025*** 0.014 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
GDPGROWTH -0.185 -8.063*** -0.431 -6.945*** 0.900 -4.886** 
 
(1.459) (2.439) (1.456) (2.420) (1.457) (2.386) 
Constant 3.013** 0.007 2.036 -2.385 3.066** 0.106 
 
(1.232) (1.693) (1.277) (1.676) (1.238) (1.657) 
N 13878 13878 13878 
N of Firms 1018 1018 1018 
chi2 1158.77 1125.99 1124.53 
Pseudo R2 0.1116 0.1089 0.1085 
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Panel B: By state 
ownership 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Internal Fund Net Equity Internal Fund Net Equity Internal Fund Net Equity 
ACCESS 1.017*** 2.104*** 2.118*** 0.083 0.163** -0.066 
 
(0.135) (0.209) (0.306) (0.537) (0.072) (0.099) 
ACCESS*LOANGDP -0.191*** -0.488*** 
    
 
(0.026) (0.044) 
    ACCESS*LNLOAN 
  
-0.203*** -0.016 
  
   
(0.031) (0.055) 
  ACCESS*RSDLOAN 
    
-0.032 -0.133*** 
     
(0.029) (0.049) 
L.LEVERAGE -2.818*** -1.499*** -2.800*** -1.499*** -2.816*** -1.502*** 
 
(0.177) (0.246) (0.178) (0.243) (0.177) (0.244) 
L.MTBV 0.113*** 0.285*** 0.126*** 0.280*** 0.109*** 0.271*** 
 
(0.025) (0.033) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025) (0.033) 
L.PROFIT 0.558** -3.622*** 0.558** -3.435*** 0.598** -3.465*** 
 
(0.253) (0.384) (0.253) (0.378) (0.253) (0.380) 
L.TANG 0.220 0.593** 0.205 0.546* 0.206 0.548** 
 
(0.165) (0.282) (0.165) (0.279) (0.165) (0.279) 
L.OPCF 7.701*** 1.542*** 7.714*** 1.222** 7.552*** 1.249*** 
 
(0.354) (0.486) (0.354) (0.483) (0.353) (0.481) 
L.CASH 2.199*** 4.746*** 2.203*** 4.612*** 2.146*** 4.606*** 
 
(0.244) (0.345) (0.245) (0.343) (0.243) (0.342) 
L.STATESHARE 0.214* -0.352* 0.096 -0.217 0.279** -0.184 
 
(0.118) (0.187) (0.119) (0.188) (0.118) (0.185) 
L.LNTA -0.085*** -0.043 -0.067** -0.044 -0.088*** -0.052 
 
(0.030) (0.038) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.038) 
AGE 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.038*** 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.020*** 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
GDPGROWTH -0.593 -6.602*** -1.175 -2.587 1.032 -2.848 
 
(1.087) (1.790) (1.118) (1.746) (1.079) (1.739) 
Constant 2.539*** -0.371 2.151*** -0.668 2.473*** -0.466 
 
(0.639) (0.849) (0.641) (0.855) (0.638) (0.845) 
N 26767 26767 26767 
N of Firms 1930 1930 1930 
chi2 2030.88 2004.15 1993.17 
Pseudo R2 0.1023 0.1007 0.0994 
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Table 4: Access to bank loans, leverage, and borrowings in credit expansion 
                                                       
The dependent variables are leverage and borrowings ratio. The borrowings ratio is the borrowings over total 
assets. The observations between 2006Q3 and 2010Q4 are used to explore the impacts of access to bank loan on 
borrowings in credit boom. Two variables are created to measure the ability to obtain bank loans by firm size 
and state ownership. BOOM is a dummy variable that measures whether the quarter is within the stimulus 
period. The key variable is the interaction term of stimulus dummy and access to bank loans. Control variables 
include market to book value, profitability ratio, tangibility ratio, cash flow, state ownership, log value of total 
asset, and firm age. The results with industry fixed effect are given in each panel. Clustered standard errors are 
presented in the brackets for coefficients. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Leverage Borrowings 
ACCESS(SIZE) 0.117*** 
 
0.063*** 
 
 
(0.019) 
 
(0.011) 
 ACCESS(SIZE)*BOOM 0.027** 
 
0.008 
 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.008) 
 ACCESS(STATE) 
 
0.007 
 
-0.020** 
  
(0.014) 
 
(0.009) 
ACCESS(STATE)*BOOM 
 
0.041*** 
 
0.019** 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.008) 
L.MTBV -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
L.PROFIT -0.294*** -0.387*** 0.043 0.013 
 
(0.068) (0.051) (0.036) (0.033) 
L.TANG 0.084* 0.049 0.069** 0.068*** 
 
(0.043) (0.032) (0.032) (0.021) 
L.CF -1.169*** -0.932*** -0.751*** -0.600*** 
 
(0.208) (0.156) (0.122) (0.105) 
AGE 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.000 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
L.STATESHARE -0.005 
 
-0.039** 
 
 
(0.023) 
 
(0.016) 
 L.LNTA 
 
0.055*** 
 
0.018*** 
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.003) 
Constant 0.468*** -0.671*** 0.152*** -0.200*** 
 
(0.030) (0.107) (0.018) (0.071) 
N 5441 10190 5364 10062 
N of Groups 726 1338 726 1337 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.4856 0.4174 0.4304 0.3979 
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Table 5: Quarterly leverage ratio 
 
Panel A gives quarterly leverage ratio for the whole sample and four treatment groups. It reports the average 
leverage ratio in these samples in six periods/quarters. The groups of large firms and small firms are the firms in 
top and bottom quintile of total assets in our data sample on 2008Q3. State-owned group and private group are 
the firms in the top quintile of state ownership and the firms with zero state ownership at the end of the third 
quarter of 2008. We compare the differences of leverage ratios before and during credit boom in whole sample 
and subsamples by t-test. 
Panel B reports difference-in-difference results for the treatment groups and their control groups. The approach 
of Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004) is employed to match the firms in these four treatment groups with 
non-treatment firms in data sample on 2008Q3. The variables in the matching are market-to-book ratio, cash 
flow, cash holdings, size, state ownership, and industrial classification code, following the studies of Almeida, 
Campello, Laranjera and Weisbenner (2012) and Kahle and Stulz (2013). DID is the traditional 
difference-in-difference estimator. ATT is the Abadie-imbens bias-corrected average treated effect on the 
treatment group. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels by heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Quarterly leverage ratio before and during credit boom     
 
Whole Large State-owned Small Private 
Period averages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Pre-boom (2006Q3-2008Q3) 0.4946 0.5661 0.4933 0.4068 0.4672 
2. Whole boom period (2008Q4-2010Q4) 0.4982 0.5948 0.5169 0.3973 0.4558 
3. 1 year before boom (2007Q4-2008Q3) 0.4917 0.5738 0.4981 0.3966 0.4590 
4. First year in boom (2008Q4-2009Q3) 0.4974 0.5937 0.5157 0.3960 0.4548 
5. 2008Q1 0.4901 0.5727 0.4926 0.3973 0.4568 
6. 2009Q1 0.4964 0.5852 0.5135 0.3990 0.4544 
      Difference (2-1) 0.0036* 0.0288*** 0.0236*** -0.0095* -0.0114** 
Difference (4-3) 0.0057*** 0.0199*** 0.0177*** -0.0006 -0.0042 
Difference (6-5) 0.0063*** 0.0125** 0.0209*** 0.0017 -0.0024 
Number of firms 1470 294 296 294 504 
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Panel B: The average changes of quarterly leverage ratio before and during credit boom 
 
Large State-owned Small Private 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-boom (2006Q3-2008Q3) versus whole boom period (2008Q4-2010Q4) 
 Treatment: whole boom - pre-boom 0.0288 0.0236 -0.0095 -0.0114 
Control: whole boom - pre-boom 0.0007 0.0038 0.0021 0.0049 
DID 0.0281*** 0.0198** -0.0117 -0.0163*** 
ATT 0.0226** 0.0276*** -0.0022 -0.0124* 
Number of treatment firms 288 276 280 490 
Number of observations in matching 1432 1432 1432 1432 
     1 year before boom (2007Q4-2008Q3) versus first year in boom (2008Q4-2009Q3) 
Treatment: first year - 1 year before 0.0199 0.0177 -0.0006 -0.0042 
Control: first year - 1 year before 0.0047 0.0043 0.0064 0.0074 
DID 0.0152** 0.0134** -0.0071 -0.0116** 
ATT 0.0111 0.0201** 0.0043 -0.0091 
Number of treatment firms 288 276 280 490 
Number of observations in matching 1431 1431 1431 1431 
     2008Q1 versus 2009Q1 
    Treatment: 2009Q1 - 2008Q1 0.0125 0.0209 0.0017 -0.0024 
Control: 2009Q1 - 2008Q1 -0.0035 -0.0009 0.0087 0.0069 
DID 0.0160** 0.0218*** -0.0070 -0.0093* 
ATT 0.0085 0.0274*** 0.0015 -0.0090 
Number of treatment firms 262 257 250 445 
Number of observations in matching 1321 1321 1321 1321 
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Table 6: Quarterly borrowings ratio 
 
Panel A gives quarterly borrowings ratio (bank loan ratio) for the whole sample and four treatment groups. It 
reports the average borrowings ratio in these samples in six periods/quarters. The groups of large firms and 
small firms are the firms in top and bottom quintile of total assets in our data sample on 2008Q3. State-owned 
group and private group are the firms in the top quintile of state ownership and the firms with zero state 
ownership at the end of the third quarter of 2008. We compare the differences of borrowings ratios before and 
during credit boom in whole sample and subsamples by t-test. 
Panel B reports difference-in-difference results for the treatment groups and their control groups. The approach 
of Abadie, Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2004) is employed to match the firms in these four treatment groups with 
non-treatment firms in data sample on 2008Q3. The variables in the matching are market-to-book ratio, cash 
flow, cash holdings, size, leverage ratio, state ownership, and industrial classification code, following the studies 
of Almeida, Campello, Laranjera and Weisbenner (2012) and Kahle and Stulz (2013). DID is the traditional 
difference-in-difference estimator. ATT is the Abadie-imbens bias-corrected average treated effect on the 
treatment group. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels by heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Quarterly borrowings ratio before and during credit boom     
 
Whole Large State-owned Small Private 
Period averages (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1. Pre-boom (2006Q3-2008Q3) 0.1512 0.1721 0.1305 0.1060 0.1538 
2. Whole boom period (2008Q4-2010Q4) 0.1591 0.1876 0.1473 0.1133 0.1545 
3. 1 year before boom (2007Q4-2008Q3) 0.1477 0.1721 0.1306 0.1040 0.1478 
4. First year in boom (2008Q4-2009Q3) 0.1502 0.1641 0.1315 0.1170 0.1521 
5. 2008Q1 0.0604 0.0771 0.0559 0.0437 0.0620 
6. 2009Q1 0.0684 0.0814 0.0663 0.0448 0.0655 
      Difference (2-1) 0.0079*** 0.0155*** 0.0167*** 0.0073* 0.0006 
Difference (4-3) 0.0024 -0.0081** 0.0009 0.0130*** 0.0042 
Difference (6-5) 0.0080*** 0.0042 0.0104** 0.0012 0.0036 
Number of firms 1476 295 296 295 506 
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Panel B: The average changes of quarterly borrowings ratio before and during credit boom 
 
Large State-owned Small Private 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-boom (2006Q3-2008Q3) versus whole boom period (2008Q4-2010Q4) 
Treatment: whole boom - pre-boom 0.0155 0.0167 0.0073 0.0006 
Control: whole boom - pre-boom 0.0086 0.0021 0.0103 0.0081 
DID 0.0070 0.0147*** -0.0030 -0.0074* 
ATT 0.0079 0.0194*** 0.0052 -0.0068 
Number of treatment firms 288 276 280 491 
Number of observations in matching 1432 1432 1432 1432 
     1 year before boom (2007Q4-2008Q3) versus first year in boom (2008Q4-2009Q3) 
Treatment: first year - 1 year before -0.0081 0.0009 0.0130 0.0043 
Control: first year - 1 year before -0.0058 -0.0072 0.0065 0.0047 
DID -0.0023 0.0081* 0.0065 -0.0004 
ATT -0.0108** 0.0092* 0.0053 0.0000 
Number of treatment firms 289 277 281 493 
Number of observations in matching 1438 1438 1438 1438 
     2008Q1 versus 2009Q1 
    Treatment: 2009Q1 - 2008Q1 0.0042 0.0104 0.0012 0.0036 
Control: 2009Q1 - 2008Q1 0.0093 0.0009 0.0253 0.0107 
DID -0.0050 0.0095** -0.0242*** -0.0072* 
ATT -0.0095* 0.0120** -0.0264*** -0.0053 
Number of treatment firms 260 255 249 444 
Number of observations in matching 1316 1316 1316 1316 
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Figure 1: M2 and bank loan in China 
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Appendix 1: Firm size, state ownership and variables of access to bank loan 
Note: the data comes from CSMAR. We firstly use quarterly data from 2002Q1 to 2013Q2 to create average 
firm size and state ownership for each company over the whole time period. Panel A shows values of Firm Size 
and State Ownership at the mean, min, 20
th
 percentile, 40
th
 percentile, 60
th
 percentile, 80
th
 percentile and max. 
Panel B indicates the conditions, firm observations and three firm characteristics for variables of access to bank 
loan. For the values of three access variables, they indicate the firm’s ability to access bank loans is the value 1; 
and 0 if without access to bank loan. ACCESS(SIZE) is created from the firm size, following Leary (2009). It 
equals to 1 if the firm size is in upper two deciles of book asset value in all listed companies; and it is 0 if the 
firm size is in the lower two deciles. ACCESS(STATE) equals to 1 if the state ownership of a firm is in upper 
two deciles of all listed companies; and it is equal to 0 if state ownership is 0. The average ratios of firm size 
and state ownership for the groups with and without access to bank loans are also given in the Panel B.  
Panel A: Firm Variable Mean Min 
20th 
Percentile 
40th 
Percentile 
60th 
Percentile 
80th 
Percentile Max 
Firm Size (log value) 21.32 19.79 20.51 20.95 21.42 22.08 23.64 
State Ownership (%) 0.16 0 0 0.01 0.19 0.34 0.66 
Panel B: Access Variable Condition N 
Firm Size 
(Mean) 
State 
Ownership 
(Mean) 
 ACCESS(SIZE)=1 22.08<Firm Size<23.64 520 22.77 0.27 
ACCESS(SIZE)=0 19.79<Firm Size<20.51 520 20.21 0.08 
ACCESS(STATE)=1 0.19<State Ownership<0.66 1041 21.71 0.35 
ACCESS(STATE)=0 State Ownership=0 927 20.98 0 
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Appendix 2: Definitions and data sources of variables 
Variable Variable Name and Brief Explanation 
ACCESS(SIZE) 
Indicator for access to bank loan by firm size. It equals to 1 if the firm size is in upper two deciles of all firm observations and 0 if in lower 
two deciles. 
ACCESS(STATE) Indicator for access to bank loan by state ownership. It equals to 1 if state ownership is in upper four deciles and 0 if state ownership is 0. 
Net Loan The increase of quarterly bank loan. It is the difference between outstanding bank loan this quarter and outstanding bank loan last quarter 
LOANGDP Quarterly net loan over GDP 
LNLOAN Log value of quarterly net loan 
RSDLOAN Residual of an autoregressive–moving-average model of log quarterly bank loan on three lags of the same quarter’s bank loans 
BOOM 
Time indicator for credit boom periods. It is a dummy that takes value 1 in stimulus periods (2008Q4-2010Q4) and 0 in the periods of 
2006Q3-2008Q3 
FINCHOICE 
Indicator for financing choices among internal funds, borrowings and equity funds. It equals to 0 if the company mostly use internal funds, 
1 if borrowings and 2 if equity financing. 
LEVERAGE Book leverage=total liability/total asset 
MTBV Market to book value 
LNTA Firms size: Natural log value of total asset 
PROFIT Profitability ratio=operating income/sale 
TANG Tangibility ratio=net fixed asset/total asset 
AGE Firm age from establishment quarter 
CF Cash flow ratio (internal fund)=(net income + depreciations)/lagged total asset 
OPCF Operating cash flow ratio=net cash flow from operating activities/lagged total asset 
BORW Borrowings ratio=proceeds from borrowings/total asset 
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NETBORW Net borrowings ratio=(proceeds from borrowings - cash paid for principal)/total asset 
EQUITY Equity fund=proceeds from equity funds /total asset 
NETEQUITY Net equity fund=(proceeds from equity funds - dividend payments) / total asset 
BOND Bond fund=proceeds from bond issuance /total asset 
OTHER Other fund=other proceeds related to financing activities /total asset 
CASH Cash ratio=(cash and cash equivalents) / lagged total asset 
GDPGROWTH Quarterly GDP growth ratio 
 
 
 
 
